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Introduction
The early 1990s brought two significant events that would shape US foreign policy as it approached the new millennium. The first was the end of the Cold War. This brought to a close a fifty-year period of zero-sum international relations in a bipolar world, in which the Soviet Union and the United States used aid, trade, and surrogate militaries in a competition to spread their ideological principles to the corners of the earth. The second significant event was the Persian Gulf War, which saw the United States assemble a multinational military coalition that carried out a United Nations mandate to overturn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. These two events demonstrated that the United Nations could finally shake off years of inaction in the world's trouble spots, because its two most powerful member states-both of whom wielded veto power over UN Security Council initiatives at international involvement-were determined to forge a more constructive relationship with each other.
With this newfound freedom of action, the Security Council broke out of its confinement of traditional peace keeping operations and into the riskier world of peace making operations. US presidents, proclaiming foreign policies of new world orders and aggressive multilateralism, readily participated in this new category of United Nations operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. The United States soon discovered, however, that peace keeping and peace making are entirely different, the latter often requiring numerous and well-armed military forces in combat-like situations.
Unfortunately, the scenarios that necessitate peace making operations are often accompanied by humanitarian emergencies (HE). These are acute, man-made or natural disasters that impose severe or widespread suffering on a population, in a country where the ruling government is unwilling or unable to respond to mitigate that suffering.
Perhaps no area has had as many HE-and on such a large scale-as Sub-Saharan Africa.
Given the levels of disease, civil war, and susceptibility to natural disasters from floods to droughts that many Sub-Saharan African countries face today, further HE are very likely.
It is also likely that the United States will feel compelled to assist in preventing or alleviating HE in Sub-Saharan Africa, as it has done previously in Somalia, Democratic This paper attempts to predict-not prescribe-when the United States is likely to employ military forces to respond to a HE in Sub-Saharan Africa, whether natural or man-made. To qualify this further, the military response must be aimed at preventing or alleviating the emergency and the accompanying suffering. Under this constraint, a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) is excluded. The purpose of a NEO is to evacuate American civilians from the HE situation, not stop the event from occurring. Now we see the United Nations beginning to act as it was designed, freed from the superpower antagonisms that often frustrated consensus, less hobbled by the ritualistic anti-Americanism that so often weakened its credibility…The role of the United Nations in improving the human condition and ameliorating human suffering-development, aid to refugees, education, disaster relief-will continue to attract our leadership and our resources. This was a stark contrast to traditional peace keeping operations, wherein the warring parties agreed to a cease fire, separated themselves geographically, and allowed armed troops under UN auspices to monitor the truce.
The origin for this type of operation is found in then-Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 work, Agenda for Peace, in which he stated, "United Nations operations in areas of crisis have generally been established after the conflict has occurred. The time has come to plan for circumstances warranting preventive deployment, which could take place in a variety of instances and ways." 3 America would further its strategic interests in the region by applying its unique capabilities to support regional actors. Those unique capabilities excluded combat forces, which other United Nations or regional members could provide.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Although this President Bush has been in office just over one year, he has already reevaluated his initial policy on Sub-Saharan Africa. That policy began inauspiciously when during a presidential debate then-Texas Governor Bush answered questions on his proposed involvement in African nation building activities:
Africa's important. And we've got to do a lot of work in Africa to promote democracy and trade. It's an important continent. But there's got to be priorities. And the Middle East is a priority for a lot of reasons as is Europe, and the Far East, and our own hemisphere. Those are my four top priorities should I be the president. It's not to say we won't be engaged [in Africa], and working hard to get other nations to come together to prevent atrocity. I thought the best example of handling a situation was East Timor when we provided logistical support to the Australians; support only we can provide. I thought that was a good model. But we can't be all things to all people in the world.
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Several policy positions were revealed in this answer. First, President Bush preferred to support regional or international engagement to prevent or halt humanitarian emergencies in Africa. This was evident by the $50 million and ten weeks spent by US 
Chapter 3 CASE STUDIES IN INVOLVEMENT Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia
Somalia is situated on the East Coast of Africa, the "Horn of Africa." A one-time colony divided between Italy and Great Britain, the population of Somalia shares a religion (Sunni Islam), an ethnicity, and a language. 1 In 1991, however, the Somalis were divided between supporters of the ruler, Mohamed Siad Barre, and a confederation of opposition groups. When Barre was overthrown, the confederation splintered into factions that engaged in a bloody struggle to fill the power vacuum.
Atrocities were committed on Somali civilians by each of the factions, but the scorched earth policy of Ali Mahdi, leader of the national congress, combined with an illtimed drought rendered much of Somalia's most fertile agricultural land useless. The
International Committee of the Red Cross was clear that a humanitarian emergency was imminent; they reported that two million Somalis were at immediate risk of starvation. Representative to the Secretary General for the Somalia operation, the logistics system created to deliver and distribute the food was so lacking that its pace of distribution was one-third that of the Red Cross. 3 The UN Security Council dispatched a force of 6,000 to protect the deliveries. Six months later, the United States joined the effort to increase its chances of success.
In 
Operation SUPPORT HOPE, Democratic Republic of Congo
The 1994 crisis in Rwanda and its resulting genocide will be discussed below as a case of American non-involvement. For this chapter it is sufficient to point out that due to the Rwandan Hutus' policy of eradicating rival Tutsis, and the latter's revenge as they had significantly reduced the daily mortality rate in the camps, delivered over 3,000 total tons of supplies, and provided 100 million gallons of purified water. 6 The United States turned over the operation to the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations, only to return two years later to those same camps.
Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE, DRC
The refugee camps were still filled to capacity in 1996, largely due to fears of retribution to either Tutsi or Hutu who returned to Rwanda. In that year, however, the political situations changed for the better in Rwanda and for the worse-much worse-in the DRC. In the fall of 1996 relief supplies headed to the camps in Goma were cut off due to the DRC's civil war. Meanwhile the Tutsi-led government of Rwanda had restored order to most of the country and created conditions for the repatriation of the refugees in Goma and elsewhere. President Clinton decided to aid in this effort. In
November he directed US European Command (EUCOM) to launch Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE (OGA) to provide supplies to those still in the camps and encourage the peaceful migration of those refugees wishing to return to Rwanda.
PDD 25 was clearly discernable behind the Commander-in-Chief, European
Command (CINCEUR) statement of intent for OGA: "Rapidly assess the situation and recommend usage of unique US military capabilities; complement/supplement designated United Nations/civilian-led agencies, minimizing the requirement for U.S. military forces…" 7 The president originally pledged to send in up to 2,000 ground forces to secure delivery of relief supplies. Based on the advice of an advance team, CINCEUR actually deployed a force of less than 500 to augment a Canadian-led response force.
According to Major General Edwin P. Smith, commander of the US Army component of OGA, the military's contribution centered around achieving information superiority concerning the movement and well-being of the refugees. To this end, the army deployed mobile training teams of psychological operations and civil affairs forces to train the Rwandan and DRC militaries on crowd movement and control. To track the progress of the refugees through uninhibited areas, the US Navy and Air Force provided aerial reconnaissance. Other unique capabilities were the logistics to restore the flow of relief supplies and the command, control, and communications (C3) to coordinate military and civilian operations in an environment with negligible infrastructure. No ground combat forces were deployed for security or peace making operations.
Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE provided further insight into the application of PDD 25 in addition to the concept of unique capabilities. According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, United States troops did not deploy until the administration had received assurances from both Rwandan and DRC military leaders that US operations would proceed unopposed. 8 As the operation proceeded, Rwanda and the DRC asked the United States and the United Nations to lessen their presence so that regional militaries could take over. President Clinton obliged. Also, from its outset OGA carried a fourmonth time limit that the United States adhered to. After that, the American military once again withdrew from Sub-Saharan Africa.
Notes
Chapter 4
CASE STUDIES IN NON-INVOLVEMENT RWANDAN GENOCIDE, 1994
In April 1994, Hutu extremists shot down an aircraft carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana as the plane returned to the capital city of Kigali. 1 They then used broadcast media to blame their rival ethnic group, the Tutsis, for the event and initiate a nationwide effort at ethnic cleansing that made similar activities in the former Yugoslavia pale by comparison. Although accurate casualty figures will never be obtained, the conservative estimate is that Hutus killed 500,000 Tutsis in a three-month period. There was no initial US response, but the UN had no choice but to respond.
When the assassination occurred, the United Nations found itself in the middle of the tumult but insufficient in number and lacking in ability to prevent the killing. In fact, forces of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) were among the first victims of the orchestrated chaos, when ten Belgian troops of UNAMIR were killed alongside the Rwandan prime minister they were protecting.
Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire commanded the 2,500-member strong UNAMIR, whose mission was to implement an agreement integrating Tutsis back into the Hutu-led government (the Arusha Accords). According to Dallaire and others, UNAMIR lacked an intelligence structure to assess accurately the strength, disposition, and (most critically) the intentions of the hard-line Hutu element that seemed determined to undermine the Arusha Accords. Timing likely played a part in President Clinton's decision not to intervene militarily.
US forces were aggressively returning control of the international response in Somalia back over to the United Nations, a mere six months after the episode in Mogadishu. The military was also engaged in restoring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina and was preparing to intervene in Haiti to stem the refugee reflux into Florida. The Rwandan situation at first looked like one the United States could bow out on, given the information available. Charles Taylor initiated a coup to overthrow the US-supported president, Samuel Doe.
Forces loyal to Taylor and Doe exchanged bouts of mass killing of noncombatants, usually conducted by one tribe against another. Doe was killed in 1990, but the fighting continued between Taylor and leaders of rival factions. Several peace accords were signed; all were broken. The end result was typical for post-colonial Africa: ten years of civil strife had left at least 100,000 Liberians dead and 1.4 million internally or externally displaced. 6 Unlike other African HE, however, the international response in Liberia was not led by the United Nations but by a regional entity, ECOWAS, and its military arm,
ECOWAS Military Operations Group (ECOMOG).
The 15 nations comprising ECOWAS feared that instability in Liberia would spill over into surrounding countries (that fear was validated in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone). To prevent that and to overcome the image of a region mired in conflict-and unsuitable for foreign investment-ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement and backed it up with ECOMOG forces.
For years ECOMOG remained incapable of creating a peaceful military climate in which the political climate could improve. Time and time again, ECOMOG found itself outnumbered or lesser equipped than the armed faction it was attempting to disarm and demobilize. The United States responded monetarily, helping to finance ECOMOG operations and postponing Liberia's debt repayments until the situation stabilized.
Militarily, the United States became involved only in the NEO.
Despite its historic ties to Liberia, the United States never considered expanding the military's role beyond NEO. Brent Scowcroft, the elder President Bush's National Security Advisor, expressed sentiments on Liberia shared by the Bush and Clinton administrations: "ECOWAS said 'This is our responsibility' and they have been doing their best to handle what is a terrible situation. If it can be handled by states in the area, then that is how it should be done." but few wanted to see the introduction of US combat forces into "their" region. 8 Finally, there were no unique capabilities US forces could have offered in Liberia.
ECOMOG became capable of handling the logistics of its operation and had shown ability to deploy throughout the country. They had extensive contacts with all the warring factions, so their intelligence networks were in place. Their downfall lay in their lack of absolute numerical superiority throughout Liberia and the surrounding countries, and in the complete unwillingness of the Liberian parties to end the fighting. The United
States had little to offer the situation except raw numbers of combat troops. The Clinton administration never seriously considered doing so.
Notes

BUILDING AND APPLYING A MODEL FOR PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Analyzing the cases of US military involvement and non-involvement to stem humanitarian emergencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, one can identify characteristics that make a situation more or less susceptible to that involvement. These are:
1. the likelihood of a permissive environment for United States military forces 2. the need for unique capabilities (lift; logistics; command, control, and communications (C3)); civil affairs; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)) as opposed to combat or police forces 3. the ability to obtain reliable information about the HE on which to base decisions to commit or not commit military forces 4. the estimated duration of a military response 5. the timing in relation to other contingencies
The most important variable appears to be the likelihood of a permissive environment. This is due in no small part to the experiences in Somalia, Bosnia, and other peace making operations, where presidents have had difficulty explaining why American soldiers were lost in situations of peripheral-rather than vital-interest.
During operations SUPPORT HOPE and GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE, the governments of the DRC, Rwanda, Angola, and others assured American presidents that they would not interfere with the humanitarian relief efforts, and they did not. Another significant variable in gauging potential United States military response is the government's access to reliable information about the situation. Sometimes the security or habitability deteriorates so much during a crisis that diplomatic staffs and nongovernmental organizations evacuate the trouble spots. Denied the information from these "eyes on the scene," presidents have proven apt not to commit military forces for situations they cannot accurately assess.
The estimated duration of US military involvement appears to be a factor, with presidents more likely to commit to situations that can be resolved in a matter of months.
This explains why the military assisted in repatriating Rwandan refugees (which took four months) but not in resettling refugees from other fronts in the DRC civil war.
The fifth significant variable, the relative timing of the HE, cannot be placed into a predictive model. The generalization can be made, though, that if the military is involved in significant operations in those regions specifically mentioned in the QDR, it will be less likely to become involved in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is as much a force size limitation as a foreign policy decision. The military is not sized to undertake multiple smaller scale contingencies without overburdening it. The unique capabilities of strategic lift, C3, and ISR--all high demand, low density assets-are particularly vulnerable.
Other variables were considered because they were exhibited in some HE but not in others. These were the internal versus international nature of the HE, its cause (manmade or natural), and the number of noncombatants affected by the emergency. The true test of any model, however, is to feed it accurate information and have it "predict" events as they actually occurred. Inclusion of these variables did not enable the model to predict the likelihood of military involvement. For example, a genocide involving 500,000 victims should have crossed any numerical threshold, but it did not prompt military involvement because the scale of most African HE are measured in the millions of victims. And yet, ATLAS RESPONSE in Mozambique aided less than 100,000 civilians.
It is now time to apply the model to several current situations in Sub-Saharan Africa that could disintegrate into a humanitarian emergency. The table examines the nature of potential HE in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda. 
